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 am pleased to be here today to speak about an important issue in 
American antitrust law: immunities and exemptions that limit or 
preclude the application of antitrust laws to certain conduct or 
industries.1  The core message of my remarks today is that the 
changing dynamics of many industries coupled with the increasing 
analytical rigor that courts and antitrust enforcement agencies apply 
should alleviate the concerns that have been cited by advocates of 
exemptions.  Free market competition is a fundamental and core 
principle of this country.  As the bipartisan Antitrust Modernization 
Commission recognized, just as private constraints on competition 
can be harmful to consumer welfare, so can government restraints.2  
Thus, the use of such restraints should be minimized. 
What our dynamic and rapidly changing economic era demands is 
an antitrust regime that is responsive to market realities.  As Bob 
Pitofsky recognized a few months ago when he accepted the John 
 
* Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. 
1 Presently, there are about thirty federal statutes that exempt some conduct from 
antitrust entirely, that limit the applicability of antitrust law to it, or that limit the penalties 
that can be assessed against it.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW 1–4, 31–52 (2007). 
2 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 333 
(2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final 
_report.pdf. 
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Sherman Award, the movement toward a more responsive set of 
substantive antitrust rules over the past few decades has been a 
salutary development whether one is an ardent Chicago School 
adherent or one believes, in the words of his most recent book, that 
portions of conservative economic analysis have “overshot the 
mark.”3  As a result of this movement toward greater analytical rigor, 
the analysis that underlies today’s antitrust enforcement is sufficiently 
clear and flexible to permit new innovative arrangements that enhance 
efficiency, obviating the need for widespread exemptions.  As I have 
stated on another occasion: 
Allegations that particular procompetitive behavior would violate 
the antitrust laws and thus should be exempted from their 
application can fail to take account of the economically sound 
competitive analysis that is used today to carefully circumscribe per 
se rules and fully analyze other conduct under the rule of reason.     
. . .  [T]he flexibility of the antitrust laws and their crucial 
importance to the economy argue strongly against antitrust 
exemptions that are not clearly and convincingly justified.4 
Unless there is some compelling reason otherwise, I strongly 
believe that vigorous competition, protected by the antitrust laws, will 
do the best job of promoting consumer welfare and the U.S. economy.  
Departures from this competitive model should be rare. 
I 
THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
It will surprise no one when I say that antitrust law and policy, and 
the markets in which they operate, have transformed dramatically 
over the past several decades.  The 1950s and 1960s saw a period of 
growing industrialization and concentration in the American 
economy, a tide that was met with vigorous enforcement of the 
antitrust laws.  To be sure, this was a period of some excessive 
intervention, in which big was sometimes condemned as bad without 
a consistent grounding in economic analysis, proof of anticompetitive 
market effects, or consideration of efficiencies.  Those days are in the 
past, however, as both antitrust law and more general economic 
 
3 HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008). 
4 Christine A. Varney, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on 
“Prohibiting Price Fixing and Other Anticompetitive Conduct in the Health Insurance 
Industry” 4 (Oct. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Varney Testimony], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public /testimony/250917.pdf. 
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policy have moved well beyond them.  Though opponents of 
enforcement will frequently raise this period as a specter for the 
harms of over-enforcement, including chilling procompetitive 
behavior, this is a straw man.  No amount of costuming should allow 
it to be confused with vigorous antitrust enforcement in its 
contemporary form. 
In fact, since this period, antitrust doctrine continued to evolve.  
Competitive analysis shifted to the fore, and both the courts and the 
enforcement community began to focus on the procompetitive aspects 
of a variety of economic arrangements and conduct.  It was here that 
the Chicago School made a real and lasting contribution to the well 
being of the American consumer.  Through its insights, antitrust 
analysis became more oriented to consumer welfare, more grounded 
in the economics that tended to produce it, and more responsive to 
market realities as a result.  Today, antitrust applies an increasingly 
nuanced approach and the growing awareness of efficiency gains 
from conduct that in past years was treated as always or almost 
always illegal.  The Supreme Court’s recent rejection of the per se 
approach in a number of cases underscores this fact.5 
This modern, market-oriented antitrust analysis is a powerful tool 
for the promotion of consumer welfare because it is attuned to market 
realities and sensitive to the possibility of efficiencies.  When 
calibrated in this way, antitrust enforcement preserves the kind of 
competitive environment that requires firms to innovate in both 
product offerings and business models in order to prosper.  
Competition is the bedrock of our economy, and we should be 
dubious of attempts to avoid it. 
I have said before that antitrust enforcement has been in need of 
some rejuvenation and that, in the course of the modernization of 
antitrust law, the pendulum swung too far in the direction of 
skepticism about enforcement and sanguinity about markets and their 
ability to self-correct.6  Yet, returning the pendulum to the center 
entails no return to the bad old days—real or imagined—when 
enforcement was divorced from the assessment of competitive harm 
or the recognition of predictable efficiencies.  To the contrary, it is 
precisely because I have faith in the flexibility and economic 
foundations of modern antitrust that I believe with such conviction 
 
5 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
6 Christine A. Varney, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era (May 
12, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm. 
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that vigorous enforcement will lead only to a healthier and more 
efficient American marketplace.  This is why I have a general 
skepticism for antitrust exemptions and the justifications that 
accompany them. 
II 
RUMORS OF TYPE I ERRORS HAVE BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED 
One justification given for exemptions is that, without them, there 
will be a chilling of procompetitive activity due to the potential for 
antitrust liability.7  As I have said before in the context of dominant 
firm conduct, I do not find arguments about Type I errors, or false 
positives, particularly convincing.  I have seen how firms conduct 
business, and I would be hard-pressed to find a single example where 
a firm refrained from clearly procompetitive unilateral or joint 
conduct because the antitrust laws apply.  Antitrust simply is not an 
obstacle to efficiency-enhancing conduct. 
The ways in which antitrust law and policy have changed over the 
past decades should dispel concerns about false positives.  For 
example, consider legal developments regarding cooperative efforts 
by competitors, the conduct most often protected by exemptions.  
Both the courts and the Division have acknowledged that cooperation 
among competitors can produce substantial efficiencies, including 
product and service offerings that would be completely unavailable 
without coordination among otherwise competitive firms.  That 
means that many collaborations—horizontal and vertical—merit 
flexible treatment under the rule of reason.  This outlook is evident in 
landmark cases such as BMI,8 Northwest Wholesale Stationers,9 and 
NCAA.10  It also suffuses the Division’s guidelines on competitor 
collaborations.11  In business review letters,12 speeches,13 and amicus 
 
7 See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 2, at 351.  Other 
justifications for exemptions include market failures, natural monopolies, and the overall 
state of the economy.  I find these equally uncompelling in most instances. 
8 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (applying the rule 
of reason to a blanket licensing scheme). 
9 Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) 
(applying the rule of reason to a cooperative buying association). 
10 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 
(1984) (applying the rule of reason to restrictions on televising college football games). 
11 FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 1 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os 
/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.  “[C]ollaborations often are not only benign but 
procompetitive.  Indeed, in the last two decades, the federal antitrust agencies have 
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filings,14 the Division has stood behind its commitment to approach 
collaborations with the care and analytical elasticity necessary to 
accommodate the many innovative arrangements that are bringing 
greater efficiency and untold possibilities to our dynamic economy.  
Firms are left with quite broad latitude to devise collaborations that 
are shown to benefit (or at least not to harm) consumers.  I see no 
reason for carte blanche immunity for these activities and no reason 
why procompetitive activities would be deterred by a rigorous and 
well-grounded antitrust enforcement policy. 
The point needn’t be belabored: antitrust law has moved well 
beyond the era of blindly condemning collaborative practices that 
may be efficient, and it is well equipped to evaluate a wide array of 
business arrangements.  We remain vigilant in condemning as per se 
illegal arrangements that are nothing more than naked price fixing.  
Yet, in the modern era of antitrust, almost all collaborations are 
subject to a more sophisticated analysis that acknowledges that—in 
the words of our guidelines—it is “[c]ompetitive forces [that] are 
driving firms toward complex collaborations to achieve goals such as 
expanding into foreign markets, funding expensive innovation efforts, 
and lowering production and other costs.”15  No exemptions are 
needed to see that “[s]uch collaborations often are not only benign but 
procompetitive.”16 
III 
CURRENT ENFORCEMENT TRANSPARENCY FURTHER MINIMIZES THE 
RISK OF FALSE POSITIVES 
The above-discussed advances in legal and economic analysis 
make modern antitrust well equipped to distinguish procompetitive 
 
brought relatively few civil cases against competitor collaborations.  Nevertheless, a 
perception that antitrust laws are skeptical about agreements among actual or potential 
competitors may deter the development of precompetitive collaborations.”  Id. 
12 See, e.g., Letter from Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., to William J. Baer 
(Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/257318.pdf. 
13 See, e.g., Christine A. Varney, Antitrust and Healthcare: Remarks as Prepared for the 
American Bar Association/American Health Lawyers Association Antitrust in Healthcare 
Conference 11–16 (May 24, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches 
/258898.pdf. 
14 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Texaco Inc. v. 
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (Nos. 04-805 & 04-814), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/atr/cases/f211000/211046.htm. 
15 FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11. 
16 Id. 
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conduct from anticompetitive conduct.  In addition, the Antitrust 
Division and the Federal Trade Commission employ various methods 
to ensure that antitrust enforcement is both predictable and 
transparent.  Let me point out three ways in particular that this goal is 
achieved. 
First, of course, are the various guidelines, reports, and policy 
statements that the agencies have issued.  The goal of these various 
efforts is to encourage efficient business behavior by clearly 
articulating an analytical framework.  Suffice it to say that, given the 
various policy commitments and safe harbors in some of these 
documents—and the clear guidance they all contain—businesses need 
not live in fear of rigid or unpredictable antitrust enforcement that 
comes down hard on procompetitive behavior. 
Second, there are the various ways in which businesses can test the 
acceptability of their arrangements or strategies without simply 
implementing them and risking litigation.  Business review letters 
provide an opportunity for industry players to present models and 
ideas to the Division and to obtain an advance statement of the 
agency’s enforcement intentions.17  In fact, requests regarding the 
formation and operation of joint ventures are one of the most frequent 
types of requests the Department receives.  The Federal Trade 
Commission has a similar procedure for advance review of 
contemplated business arrangements.18  At the Division, we are 
willing to work with firms that have innovative ideas about their 
business models so that they can avoid antitrust concerns, and we 
frequently do so.  This promotes our enforcement aims. 
We are not only on the lookout for conduct that may be harming 
competition but also in the business of facilitating procompetitive 
conduct and supporting innovative business arrangements to the 
extent we can.  For instance, the Division recently addressed the 
Associated Press’s proposal to establish a voluntary news registry that 
would list content from various providers in a single forum.  Those 
seeking to republish the content could turn to this registry as a central 
place for republication rights.  Although this plan would bring 
together various competing news providers, the Division concluded 
that it was unlikely to harm competition and could simultaneously 
 
17 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6.  For a description of the process through which a business 
review can be requested, see DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PILOT PROGRAM ANNOUNCED TO 
EXPEDITE BUSINESS REVIEW PROCESS (1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr 
/public/busreview/201659a.htm (Business Reviews section). 
18 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–1.4. 
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“provide a new, efficient mechanism through which content users can 
identify applicable terms of use and purchase licenses for news 
content they want to use.”19 
To put it plainly, the complaint that antitrust law is frequently too 
rigid to accommodate efficiency-enhancing business behavior has 
been overtaken by events.  The reality is that, in the modern era of 
antitrust law and policy, the kind of efficient behavior that is 
ultimately beneficial for fair and free markets is rarely—if ever—
subject to enforcement.  To the contrary, modern antitrust law and 
enforcement policy have the ability to protect the economy from 
anticompetitive behavior without stifling the kinds of innovative, 
procompetitive business behavior that keeps our dynamic economy 
moving and growing. 
IV 
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON 
One example of an exemption that I believe it is time to retire is the 
exemption for “the business of insurance” contained in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.  As stated in my congressional statement on this topic: 
[T]he application of the antitrust laws to potentially procompetitive 
collective activity has become far more sophisticated during the 62 
years since the McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted.  Some forms 
of joint activity that might have been prohibited under earlier, more 
restrictive doctrines are now clearly permissible, or at very least 
analyzed under a rule of reason that takes appropriate account of the 
circumstances and efficient operation of a particular industry.  Thus, 
there is far less reason for concern that overly restrictive antitrust 
rulings would impair the insurance industry’s efficiency.”20 
McCarran-Ferguson immunity historically relied upon two 
premises.  The first was that pervasive state law regulation of 
insurance would be preempted by the Sherman Act in the absence of 
an antitrust exemption.  That is why McCarran-Ferguson exempts 
“the business of insurance” only to the extent that it is “regulated by 
State law.”  McCarran-Ferguson immunity was in large part a 
response to South-Eastern Underwriters,21 in which the Supreme 
Court held that the insurance business was within Congress’s 
commerce power, and so raised the specter that antitrust would 
 
19 See Letter from Christine A. Varney, supra note 12, at 3. 
20 Varney Testimony, supra note 4, at 5. 
21 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
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preempt state regulation and taxation of insurance.  Then, the “state 
action” doctrine first announced in Parker v. Brown22 was only in its 
infancy.  Today, however, that doctrine has been comprehensively 
developed, and it is now clear that—rather than being preempted by 
antitrust—state law can immunize restraints with a clearly articulated, 
affirmatively expressed intention to displace competition, coupled 
with active state oversight.23  This overlap makes McCarran-Ferguson 
immunity for the purpose of allowing state regulation unnecessary at 
best. 
The reality can be worse than mere overlap, however.  Under 
McCarran-Ferguson, limited regulation providing for insufficient 
supervision can be enough to supplant antitrust.  In the words of one 
leading treatise, “the presence of even minimal state regulation, even 
on an issue unrelated to the antitrust suit, is generally sufficient to 
preserve the immunity.”24  As Supreme Court cases make clear, 
however, Parker immunity would require more affirmative 
government action. 
Second, McCarran-Ferguson was enacted because of the concern 
that the antitrust laws would condemn cooperative joint activities 
such as information sharing designed to improve the functioning of 
the insurance system.  Yet, as I explained, the application of the 
antitrust laws to efficiency-enhancing joint activities has become 
much more flexible, favorable, and predictable.  The result is that the 
vast majority of cooperative activities that might have once been of 
theoretical concern in the absence of McCarran-Ferguson immunity 
are now clearly permissible.  The American Bar Association,25 the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission,26 and leading scholars27 all 
agree—in the words of the leading treatise: “[m]any, perhaps most, of 
the challenged practices need no immunity because they do not 
violate the antitrust laws.”28  Those that would violate antitrust laws 
are ones we should be concerned about, not granting immunity to. 
 
22 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
23 See, e.g., Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Cas., 985 F.2d 1138 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(immunizing conduct under Parker that involved collective rate making). 
24 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 219c, at 25 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
25 AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 
(2d ed. 2006). 
26 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 2, at 351. 
27 See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, ¶ 219d. 
28 Id. 
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The better scheme would be to allow the insurance firms to rely on 
Parker immunity where appropriate and to otherwise justify their 
arrangements as good for competition—just as every other industry 
does.  That is the approach we have advocated and continue to 
endorse today.  In this way, we can see the returns of market-oriented 
antitrust law and policy in this important sector of our economy. 
I am hopeful that congressional action on this front will continue to 
move forward.  Bills to repeal McCarran-Ferguson are advancing, and 
they have the strong support of the administration and private groups 
like the American Antitrust Institute.  A number of other exemptions 
are decades old and were implemented at a time when the U.S. 
economy was very different and antitrust analysis less nuanced.  
Reevaluating whether the justifications for certain exemptions still 
apply (if they ever did) may well be warranted.  I urge you to keep up 
your efforts on this front so that—sooner rather than later—the 
benefits of full antitrust oversight will be restored more broadly. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me close with a few thoughts about where these observations 
leave us. 
First, new legislative exemptions for specific industries should be 
avoided absent a clear and compelling reason why such an exemption 
is in the public interest despite an obvious loss in consumer welfare.  
With the economic downturn, some industries have argued that their 
continued strength or existence depends upon an exemption from the 
antitrust laws.  Yet, in the age of market-oriented antitrust 
enforcement, the law is highly unlikely to condemn or deter any 
arrangement necessary to bring desirable products to consumers.  
Legislators should not support special interest efforts to avoid the 
rigors of competition to the detriment of consumers. 
Second, I agree with the Antitrust Modernization Commission that, 
in the rare case that an exemption is found to be necessary, it should 
be crafted in the least restrictive way needed to achieve the desired 
public interest.  A recently enacted example is the Standards 
Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, which 
eliminates per se liability for a standards development organization 
while engaged in standards development activities and provides an 
opportunity to limit antitrust liability to actual, as opposed to treble 
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damages.29  The statute protects the standard-setting body, not 
anticompetitive conduct by its individual members, and rather than 
eliminating antitrust oversight, it mandates only rule of reason review 
and limits successful claimants to single damages.  In some important 
respects, this exemption may not be necessary; standard setting 
produces substantial efficiencies and would almost always be subject 
to rule of reason analysis anyway.30  Still, such narrow and tailored 
exemptions that preserve but limit antitrust enforcement are a better 
model than sweeping and overbroad exemptions that authorize even 
hard-core price fixing and output restriction. 
Finally, exemptions for regulated industries should be kept narrow, 
recognizing that antitrust and regulation are complements, not 
substitutes.  The contemporary approach to these industries is built 
upon the power of competitive markets, and antitrust law and policy 
are capable of responding with flexibility to promote and protect that 
competition without standing in the way of the regulatory regime.  
Indeed, regulators and antitrust enforcers should be empowered—to 
the greatest extent possible—to work together in these industries to 
bring the benefits of competition to an ever growing set of markets 
and their consumers. 
 
 
29 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
237, § 213(a), 118 Stat. 661, 666 (2004). 
30 Christine A. Varney, Promoting Innovation Through Patent and Antitrust Law and 
Policy: Remarks as Prepared for the Joint Workshop of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice on the Intersection 
of Patent Policy and Competition Policy: Implications for Promoting Innovation (May 26, 
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/260101.pdf. 
